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Abstract  Post-war environmental concern has been powerfully shaped by projections of 
ecological catastrophe. Indeed, it can be said that the global environment as an object of social 
and political concern came into existence in part through narratives of future crisis. This paper 
explores two successive framings of environmental crisis and the kinds of knowledges that 
made them up. It examines the announcement of ecological limits to economic growth in the 
early 1970s, the culmination of an early wave of popular green concern that modelled the future 
as a choice between the catastrophic continuation of business as usual and the prospect of eco-
utopian alternatives. It considers the crisis logics of contemporary climate dynamics, where the 
power of scientific modelling leaves little room for the imagination of radically different 
futures. Environmental crisis now cannot perform the anticipatory and utopian functions that 
it once did. The ‘apocalyptic horizon’ (Dryzek) of limits has given way to the collapse of crisis 
into the present and new kinds of colonisation of the future. But in both cases environmental 
crisis can be read as a science fictional object, simultaneously descriptive and speculative, 
scientific and fictional. Science fiction tropes were crucial to early constructions of 
environmental crisis, and speculative climate fiction will be a vital resource for negotiating the 
social-natural futures of the Anthropocene.  
 
 
The idea of environmental crisis 
For the past 50 years, from the limits to growth in the 1970s to climate change today, 
environmental concern has been shaped by projections of potentially catastrophic disruption to 
ecological and economic systems. Indeed in many ways the idea of the global environment as 
an object of social and political concern does not exist without narratives concerning the “crisis 
about its future.”2 As Ross has argued, of all the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
“the ecology movement was the one most tied to an explicit set of theses about the future: how 
                                                        
1 School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK.  
2 Libby Robin, Sverker Sörlin and Paul Warde, “Introduction: Documenting Global Change” in The Future 
of Nature: Documents of Global Change, edited by Libby Robin, Sverker Sörlin and Paul Warde (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 6-7. 
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to avoid a disastrous, and generate a better, future.”3 In this paper I explore the kinds of 
knowledges that have made up successive ideas of environmental crisis and environmental 
futures. I focus in particular on the relationship between techno-scientific projections and wider 
cultural repertoires of speculation: between environmental science and green science fiction; 
between predictions of ecological catastrophe and dreams of better futures with and for nature.  
 
Environmental crisis is closely linked to claims to scientific certainty, predictive statements 
and policy expertise. As Robin et. al. put it, “[t]he Age of Environment has been nurtured by 
the Era of Prediction.”4 But both have also been deeply entangled with speculative and fictional 
imaginaries that raise ethical, political and even metaphysical questions about human prospects 
in a changing natural world.   Ideas of environmental crisis since the 1970s have been composed 
of varying admixtures of systematic and self-consciously objective attempts to model eco-
social future trajectories on one hand, and heuristic and affective future imaginaries on the 
other. In this respect environmental concern typifies the sometimes synergistic and sometimes 
sterile tension between technocratic extrapolation and humanist utopianism that Andersson 
identifies at the core of the post-war project of futures studies.5 Understanding science and 
speculation together offers a rich picture of the history of contemporary environmental ideas 
and a nuanced understanding of what has changed in crisis narratives between the 1970s and 
the present day, both in terms of the scientific epistemologies that make up crisis, and in terms 
of the work that crisis does on and in the popular and political imagination.  
                                                        
3 Andrew Ross, Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age of Limits (London: Verso, 
1991), 184.  
4 Robin et. al. “Introduction,” Preface. 
5 Jenny Andersson, “Midwives of the Future: Futurism, Futures Studies and the Shaping of the Global 
Imagination,” in The Struggle for the Long Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging the 
Future, edited by Jenny Andersson and Egle Rindzeviciute (London: Routledge, 2015); Jenny Andersson, 
“The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World,” The American Historical Review 117, no. 5 
(December 2012); Jenny Andersson and Sibylle Duhautois, “Futures of Mankind: the Emergence of the 
Global Future,” in The Politics of Globality Since 1945: Assembling the Planet, edited by Rens Van 
Munster and Casper Sylvestre (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); see also Ross, Strange Weather.  
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With that in mind I work through two arguments in this article. The first is that environmental 
crisis now is not the same as environmental crisis then. In the 1970s ecological crisis usually 
took the form of a future projection based on highly abstract models of large-scale global 
systems. The idea of crisis in this period introduced a shocking and novel “apocalyptic 
horizon”6 into modern Western imaginaries of progress and the future, and as such it opened 
up debates about radically different alternatives: apocalypse or utopia; economic business as 
usual or an ecology for people and planet; heedless progress or mindful stability; collapse or 
sustainability. Today, environmental crisis is no longer a novelty.  We are effectively living 
through what Wynne calls the “predictive shadow”7  of the first announcement of impending 
crisis. Buell argues that environmental apocalypse now feels something more like “a way of 
life”8 than a projection.  The present is saturated with slowly unfolding environmental collapse, 
and the future is colonised by warming mechanisms already in train. In these circumstances, 
the idea that the prospect of crisis might stimulate radical social change can seem much less 
tangible.  In what follows I focus on some of the contrasts between the projection of 
environmental crisis under the sign of the limits to growth in the 1970s, and the idea of climate 
crisis as a public, cultural and technoscientific object after the publication of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 4th Assessment Report in 2007.9 
 
                                                        
6 John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 37. 
7 Brian Wynne, “Strange Weather, Again: Climate Change as Political Art,” Theory, Culture and Society 
27, nos. 2-3 (2010): 298.  
8 Frederick Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century (New 
York, Routledge, 2003). 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. 
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)], (IPCC, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2007). 
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My second argument is that environmental crisis can productively be read as a science fictional 
object, that is, as an epistemic entity composed of orientations to planetary futures that are at 
once descriptive and speculative, scientific and fictional. I base this argument in part on a 
theoretical claim about the nature of the science fictional imagination and the distinctive 
position of the genre as “the literature of technoscientific societies.”10 I understand science 
fiction after Csicsery-Ronay as a cultural sensibility that emerged over the course of the 20th 
century in response to intense scientific and technological change. Its fictional mode combines 
extrapolative and cognitive mapping of technoscientific innovation with socio-political and 
ethical critique of likely outcomes. This sensibility helped make environmental crisis thinkable. 
My argument also involves the more specific suggestion that popular scientific framings of 
environmental crisis in the 1960s and into the early 1970s drew extensively on science fiction 
tropes, rhetorics, icons and narratives already in cultural circulation. In this sense the scientific 
and the science fictional were constitutively entangled in making up the environmental crisis 
as a matter of public and political concern. As we grapple now with a present and a future being 
rapidly reshaped by climate dynamics, science fiction is doing vital work examining the 
prospects for a liveable Anthropocene, even generating new ways of thinking about the 
possibility of a better one. 
 
The science fictionality of environmental crisis 
In histories of modern environmentalism the announcement of ecological crisis in the 1960s 
and 1970s is seen as a critical moment. 11 In this telling, crisis is understood as political and 
                                                        
10 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr., The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2008).  
11 Selective examples include Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2007, 4th 
ed.); Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory Towards an Ecocentric Approach (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1992); Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: 
Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989); 
David Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism (London: Routledge, 1984); Douglas Torgerson, 
The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere (Durham, N.C: Duke University 
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metaphysical: a means of making a radical intervention into the politics of unsustainability, 
challenging humanity to reject exploitative and destructive capitalism and pursue a more 
sustainable life in touch with nature. More recently, in histories of science and STS, the focus 
has been how systems modelling and the cybernetic sciences helped to create the idea of 
planetary crisis - and how in turn the prospect of system collapse helped to construct emerging 
discourses of globality and planetary environmental management.12 In this telling, 
environmental crisis is a product of shifts in the co-production of scientific knowledge in the 
middle of the 20th century, or appears as a crisis in objectivity revealing the hybridity of social, 
natural and technological systems, and an opportunity to reimagine the politics of nature.13  
 
Both environmental histories and STS accounts touch on the links between environmentalism 
and science fiction. Environmental histories often identify Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as a 
foundational text, especially the opening chapter with its powerfully apocalyptic image of a 
future American small town leached of life by chemical pesticides and pollution.  STS studies 
touch on some of the science fiction texts that accompanied the announcement of 
environmental crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular the dystopian narratives of 
overpopulation and pollution that formed part of the trope or metaphor of “spaceship earth”14 
that Hohler argues was critical to the emergence of discourses of planetary management. But 
                                                        
Press, 1999); Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, 2nd ed.). These histories also make clear that the making of modern environmental 
thought involved the recovery and recontextualization of earlier 19th and 20th century writers who 
emphasised not crisis but conservation, living in place, and romantic accounts of nature’s intrinsic value – 
Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, John Muir, Henry David Thoreau. See for example Worster, Nature’s 
Economy, 342-356. 
12 Sabine Höhler, Spaceship Earth in the Environmental Age, 1960-1990 (London: Routledge, 
2016). Fernando Elichirigoity, Planet Management: Limits to Growth, Computer Simulation, and the 
Emergence of Global Spaces (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999).  See also Andersson 
and Duhautois “Futures of Mankind.” 
13 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
14 Höhler, Spaceship Earth. 
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few studies have looked systematically at the changing relationship between science fiction 
and environmental crisis since the 1970s or drawn on the resources of science fiction literary 
criticism to do so. Accounts that have explored the nexus of science fiction and environmental 
rhetoric have focused almost exclusively on dystopian and (post-) apocalyptic narratives15 at 
the expense of exploring the strands of utopian thinking that have been such an important part 
of modern environmental thinking. To understand environmental crisis, then, we need to 
understand its historical emergence at the intersection of politics, fiction and science as well as 
its changing cultural functions in mobilising debates about ethical and social alternatives - 
including both apocalyptic visions and intimations of better futures with nature that would be 
sustainable, satisfying and equal.  
 
Approaching the environmental crisis through the lens of science fiction is a way of exploring 
the history of environmental ideas across varied epistemic claims and multiple knowledge 
contexts.  It offers new insights into how ecopolitical ideas emerged from a cultural backdrop 
rich in science fictional tropes, and how environmental modelling has been taken up and 
elaborated in genre literature. I will sketch some of the specificities of these intertextual 
connections in what follows. But I also want to suggest a more fundamental and general way 
in which the science fictional imagination has played a constitutive part in the very idea of 
environmental crisis. Cscisery-Ronay argues that over the course of the 20th century science 
fiction literature and its ideas have saturated modern Western cultures. This makes possible a 
“mood,” “habit of mind” or “kind of awareness”16 that is powerfully alert to the constant 
                                                        
15 Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life; Ross, Strange Weather; M. Jimmie Killingsworth and 
Jacqueline S. Palmer, “Millennial Ecology: The Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global 
Warming,” in Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America, edited by Carl G. Herndl 
and Stuart C. Brown, Madison WIS, University of Wisconsin Press, 1996, pp.21-45; M. Jimmie 
Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science Fiction: An Essay in the History and 
Rhetoric of Narrative,” in And No Birds Sing: Rhetorical Analyses of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
edited by Craig Waddell, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 2000, 177.   
16 Csicsery-Ronay, Seven Beauties, 2-3. 
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emergence of technoscientific novelty and which offers a toolkit of tropes, metaphors, icons 
and narratives for speculating about the futures and social forms that those innovations might 
bring about. The science fictional imagination is about the pleasures of playing in and with 
those possible futures. It also involves a distinctive attitude of estrangement and critique: a way 
of stepping back from how things are and from the apparent certainties of prospective scientific 
knowledge claims in order to enact what Csicsery-Ronay calls a double hesitation: a pause in 
which the critical imagination is mobilised to interrogate what is plausible, and to consider 
what is ethical or desirable.  
 
The very idea of environmental crisis involves a kind of science fictional imagination. It 
involves being able to apprehend the earth, its ecosystems and socio-economic arrangements 
as a single entity, viewed from outside. It involves being able to project a common future for 
humanity over a 100-year timescale. Modern environmentalism has always depended on 
projected planetary futures to make its case, and those futures have always been in the most 
basic of senses fictional: imagined, created, narrated. They have been science fictional insofar 
as they partake of science fiction’s extrapolative critique of technoscience. It is not a 
coincidence that modern environmentalism emerged contemporaneously with a major shift in 
science fiction: from being a genre largely celebratory of scientific futurism and technocratic 
models of progress (peaking in the early 1950s17) to, by the early 1970s, one increasingly 
critical of the powers of technoscience and alienated from the supposed benefits of Western 
modernity. Both have offered images of overcrowded cities; burning, drowning and drying 
worlds; angry protagonists fighting back against despair.  Dystopian science fiction from the 
1950s to the 1970s, in the novels of J G Ballard, John Wyndham, Frank Herbert, Ursula K Le 
                                                        
17 Specifically 1953, according to Thomas M. Disch, “On Saving the World,” in The Ruins of Earth, edited 
by Thomas M. Disch (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1973), 9. 
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Guin, Phillip K Dick, John Brunner and Harry Harrison, both anticipated and reflected 
environmentalist themes of pollution, overpopulation, limits to growth and widespread 
alienation.18 
 
In this period an emergent environmentalism and a changing science fiction were operating 
together to map and contest the globalising hubris of military-capitalist technoscience. They 
did so in the shadow of the bomb and the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Worster dates the “age 
of ecology” to the first atomic explosion in 1945, the consequences of which included 
widespread “doubt” about “the entire project of the domination of nature that had been at the 
heart of modern history, “the moral legitimacy of science, the tumultuous pace of 
technology.”19 Thomas Disch, editing an early collection of science fiction short stories about 
environmental crisis in 1971, also makes this connection by  characterising ecological 
destruction as “bombs” that are “already dropping.”20  Today’s crisis is not shaped by not only 
by different substantive threats but by a different logic:  of chronic, ongoing and well-known 
environmental dynamics, including the logics of climate change that are already in train.  
Science is now better at mapping threats and modelling likely futures; but critical and 
imaginative political and social thinking is more, not less, important. Science fiction continues 
to furnish contemporary cultures with crucial resources for imagining environmental futures.  
 
Inventing environmental crisis: limits, science and science fiction in the 
1970s 
                                                        
18 In this article my primary focus is on novel-length science fiction; science fiction film and short stories 
would obviously add further examples and themes to this list . 
19 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 342, 343. 
20 “In effect the bombs are already dropping – as more carbon monoxide pollutes the air… as mercury 
poisons our waters, our fish, and ourselves, and as one by one our technology extinguishes forms of life 
upon which our own life on this planet depends.” Disch, “On Saving the World,” p. 11. This connection 
culturally is a complex one. The continuities are important – but modern environmentalist discourse is 
distinctive in its addition of a pervasive sense of the vulnerability of nature and a focus on crisis in 
interconnecting systems – see Worster, Nature’s Economy and other useful discussions in Ross, Strange 
Weather; Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life; Killingsworth and Palmer, “Millennial Ecology,” inter 
alia.  
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If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and 
resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached something 
within the next one hundred years. The probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable 
decline in population and industrial capacity.21 
 
In 1972 the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome on 
the Predicament of Mankind.  This widely publicised assessment of future global development 
aimed to show that over the next 100 years unconstrained economic growth would compromise 
and ultimately break the capacity of earth’s ecosystems to support human life. In the fifty years 
since its publication, the idea of limits to growth has been dismissed as economically naïve 
neo-Malthusianism and green Doomsday pessimism. Its models and methodologies have been 
critically deconstructed, and its data has been dismissed. By the mid-1980s global policy-
makers were keen to dismantle the notion of a single planetary limit to growth and frame the 
ecological challenge instead in terms of sustainable development and multiple development 
pathways.22  But in its time The Limits to Growth “opened the public imaginary to the 
possibility of thinking anew about the relation between humanity and the biosphere.”23 It 
presented that relationship in term of a globally interconnected systems, remaking the planet 
as a unified object of technoscientific knowledge and a field for management and 
intervention.24 It also provided new conceptual resources for a nascent environmental 
movement by holistically projecting dynamics of resource depletion, population, population 
growth and industrial expansion over the next century to suggest that the trajectory of industrial 
capitalist growth was heading inevitably towards global collapse.  
 
                                                        
21 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens III. The Limits to 
Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe 
Books, 1972), 23. 
22 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 43. Garforth, Green Utopias, 40-48.  
23 Elichirigoity, Planet Management, 111.  
24 Elichirigoity, Planet Management, 7.  
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The Limits to Growth did not invent the idea of environmental crisis, nor was it unique in 
attaching environmental concerns to uncertain futures. But it did introduce a way of projecting 
earthly trajectories that could claim to be scientific. The World System about which The Limits 
to Growth made its arguments was not the empirical earth of geology and ecology or the 
sensory earth of everyday experience. It was the product of new epistemic practices that 
allowed the globe as an object to be seen and measured from the outside: via new technologies 
of visualisation, in the case of the photographic images of earth enabled by human space flight 
in the late 1960s and 1970s;25 and via computer simulations constructed in the logical terms of 
systems theory. As has been extensively documented,26 in The Limits to Growth the humanistic, 
existential “world problematique” of the Club of Rome met the “mathematically 
conceptualize[d] planet” of Jay Forrester’s dynamic systems models.27 Forrester had already 
used his training in post-war cybernetic sciences to simulate the future behaviours of systems 
including factories and cities. He had developed techniques for abstracting and quantifying 
complex dynamic interactions among multiple interdependent factors, in particular the positive 
and negative feedback loops through which systems self-regulate. In the early 1970s Forrester 
offered this methodology to the Club of Rome. A team led by Dennis Meadows modelled 
relationships among global rates of population, industrialization, pollution, food production 
and resource depletion, and then generated aggregated global data for each variable. Digital 
algorithms enabled interactions among variables to be simulated across different ‘runs’ over 
100 years or so.  
 
                                                        
25 Wolfgang Sachs, “The Blue Planet: An Ambiguous Modern Icon” The Ecologist 24, no. 5 (1994), 170. 
See also Höhler, Spaceship Earth. 
26 Patrick W. McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space Colonies, 
Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013); 
Andersson, “The Great Future Debate”; Elichirigoity, Planet Management; Höhler, Spaceship Earth. 
27 McCray, The Visioneers, 29-30.  
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The data on world industrial development, resource use, pollution and so on that fed the World 
System model had to be conceptualized and aggregated from multiple incommensurate 
sources. As Elichirigoity points out, the model in effect created the global data rather than vice 
versa.28 The Club of Rome’s aim was to “represent real world relationships pictorially or 
mathematically,” with the emphasis on visual simplicity and ease of understanding. 29  The 
graphs that show the World System runs in The Limits to Growth use vague quantities and 
shifting timescales. Numerical values, they admit, are “only approximately known.”30 The 
point is not quantitative accuracy but rather demonstrating the “relations between variables.”31 
The emphasis is on the “functional interdependence” of a system constituted via “conceptual 
and arithmetic abstraction and simplification:”32 “system structure and dynamics mattered far 
more than precise inputs.”33 
 
The scientific knowledge that makes up environmental crisis then was not simply a product of 
empirical observations but related to abstractions based on principles derived from systems 
theory. It is well known that Forrester’s models foregrounded certain kinds of dynamic 
relationships, in particular logics of exponential growth and delayed feedback loops. The 
epistemological centrality of feedback and amplification in systems dynamics and cybernetic 
meant that the models almost always projected sudden and catastrophic change. They 
emphasised exponential growth rather than gradual or linear trajectories. The continuity of the 
                                                        
28 Elichirigoity, Planet Management, 90. 
29 Dennis Meadows cited in Elichirigoity, Planet Management, 97. 
30 Dennis Meadows cited in Höhler Spaceship Earth, 72. Höhler shows how the graphs in The Limits to 
Growth removed the vertical scales to bring multiple variables together on a single axis showing a 
multifactorial planetary catastrophe.   
31 McCray, The Visioneers, 30. 
32 Höhler Spaceship Earth, 71. 
33 Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global 
Warming (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010), 367.  
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current system cannot be taken for granted. Crisis is built in; the model is designed from the 
outset to project an impending “global emergency.”34 As Edwards argues,   
[n]o matter what they were simulating, Forrester’s models tended to be insensitive to changes 
in most parameters […] the models offered a way to discover the few parameters and 
structural changes that […] would otherwise escape anyone’s attempt to control them.35  
 
World Systems models were designed from the outset to be about crisis and intervention rather 
than prediction for its own sake. The Limits to Growth carefully framed its futures as scenarios 
or projections, not forecasts.  The Club of Rome expected in fact that the presence of 
catastrophe in the limits models would underwrite a rational argument for a planned transition 
to a sustainable or steady-state future.   
 
Insisting on the possibility of the future as discontinuity, limits brought into play what had 
previously been an “apparently unnatural and unimaginable” prospect:36 a no-growth economy 
and a society in which human wellbeing is not predicated on consumption and expansion. In 
this way, environmental crisis might be said to have a science fictional or utopian function. 
The idea of planetary limits drops a novum, a novel piece of scientific or technological 
knowledge, into our cognitive worlds.37 It has the capacity to unsettle assumptions and make 
existing social and political arrangements seem contingent and open to change. It works 
through defamiliarization and the speculative imagination to distance us from everyday 
perceptions and understandings.38  The progressive future in which economic growth 
guarantees human wellbeing and nature is used instrumentally is estranged. An ecologically 
sustainable alternative is made thinkable, even desirable.  This articulation of environmental 
                                                        
34 The Club of Rome’s Aurelio Peccei, cited in Elichirigoity, Planet Management, 67. 
35 Edwards, A Vast Machine, 367.  
36 Meadows et. al., The Limits to Growth, 167. 
37 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).  
38 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science Fiction,” 183. 
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crisis depends on a kind of science fictional imaginary that has made possible the ability to 
understand the earth from the outside - as a technologically transformed object and in relation 
to timescales outside human experience.  
 
A key ingredient of that novum was the metaphor of “spaceship earth” that had been emerging 
in environmental discourse through the 1960s. As Höhler has shown, spaceship earth - our own 
planet “newly discovered,” singular, knowable and limited39 - is a technoscientific object. But 
it also depends on a science fictional metaphor that substitutes the soft planet of nature, 
everyday sensory experience and existential comfort with a much harder and stranger one 
composed of technologies, manufactured objects and limited supplies. Human space flight in 
the 1960s itself was itself, Höhler suggest, as much science fictional as real.40 By 1968 piloted 
space flight had produced images of the blue planet, the earth seen from space, finite, fragile 
and unique. But the possibilities of exploration in the solar system and beyond that it opened 
up remained (and remain) prospective, even fantastical. The visual figure of the spaceship that 
frames environmental crisis discourse in the late 1960s and early 1970s then sounds scientific 
but derives as much from Star Trek and Solaris as it does from the Apollo 8 or 11 missions.41  
 
In this and many other ways the idea of crisis articulated as science in the limits to growth 
clearly emerges from a cultural context rich in science fiction. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
was a crucial popular science text in the mobilisation of apocalyptic rhetorics and the 
                                                        
39 Höhler Spaceship Earth, 8. 
40 “already mastered […] and yet aspired to...”Höhler Spaceship Earth, 47. 
41 The original Star Trek seasons 1-3 were aired from 1966 to 1969. Stanislav Lem’s novel Solaris was 
published in  1961 with the Tarkovsky film following in 1972. Apollo 8 in 1968 saw the earliest US moon 
orbits and generated the ‘Earthrise’ images of the blue planet seen from space. Apollo 11 was the mission 
of the first moon landing in 1969. The metaphor spaceship earth dates originally to the 19th century but 
comes to prominence in popular discourse as it was used by Kenneth Boulding in 1966 and Buckminster 
Fuller in 1968, and becomes an icon of environmentalism after its use by UN Secretary General U Thant 
on Earth Day 1971. For a fuller discussion see Höhler Spaceship Earth.  
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elaboration of what Killingsworth and Palmer call “millennial ecology.”42  The “speculative” 
and “emotional” qualities of Carson’s text, along with its formal innovation as a thought 
experiment about the slow end of the world through pollution, led it to be dismissed by 
scientists in its own time as mere science fiction – trivial and fantastical.43 But those qualities 
are now celebrated as the source of its “moral complexity” and rhetorical power.44 
Killingsworth and Palmer read Silent Spring as a creative experiment at the edges of popular 
science and science fiction, borrowing and rewriting apocalyptic tropes45  to insist on the 
possibility of change and renewal.46 In its wake, announcements and elaborations of 
environmental crisis proliferated in popular culture, co-mingling ideas and approaches from 
academic ecology, systems science, popular science and science fiction.  Predictions of a 
ticking population bomb juxtaposed ideas about earth’s carrying capacity drawn from 
ecosystems ecology with social and political scenarios of war, famine and sterilisation and 
suicide programmes.   
 
In the 1960s and 1970s popular science often used futuristic narratives and science fictional 
rhetorics (sometimes carefully, sometimes indiscriminately47) to warn of impending 
environmental crisis. Paul Ehrlich, a prominent bioscientist, wrote narratives that mixed 
systems science,  statistical demography and action-thriller storytelling to depict a world on 
the precipice of catastrophic overpopulation. His book The Population Bomb presented 
                                                        
42 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Millennial Ecology;” Killingsworth and Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science 
Fiction,” 191. 
43 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science Fiction,” 175.  
44 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science Fiction,” 181. 
45 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Millennial Ecology.” 
46 Killingsworth and Palmer, “Silent Spring and Science Fiction,” 177.   
47 Killingsworth and Palmer (“Millennial Ecology,” 32) describe Ehrlich’s tone in The Population Bomb 
as that of “a prophet living in the last days.” It is difficult now, however,  not to read the opening of the 
book as an account of privileged white revulsion in response to an unfamiliar and densely populated city in 
the global South as much as a scientific treatise on global population.  
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dramatic fictional projections as popular science (although a related essay, ‘Ecocatastrophe!’ 
was later published in a science fiction anthology).48  At the same time as popular science were 
projecting fantastical futures, science fiction writers and editors soberly claimed that their 
stories were about observable facts in the present, “not catastrophes of the imagination.”49  Near 
future dystopian narratives of systemic environmental collapse proliferated in in the 1960s 
(Harry Harrison’s 1966 Make Room! Make Room, filmed as Soylent Green in 1973; John 
Brunner’s 1968 Stand on Zanzibar and The Sheep Look Up 1972; Philip K Dick’s 1968 Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep).   In the decade between Silent Spring and The Limits to 
Growth, the idea of a future environmental crisis emerged in multiple forms across popular 
science, genre fiction and environmental politics.   
 
There was a powerfully utopian dimension to all these constructions of environmental crisis. It 
is often argued that ideas about limits framed the cultural mood of the 1970s in one-
dimensionally “catastrophic”50 or “pessimistic”51 terms. McCray dwells on the “bleak 
assessment of the future”52 launched by limits to growth, a sudden reversal of decades of 
progressive optimism, apprehensive about technology, anxious about pollution and resource 
depletion, looking ahead to a cramped, regressive future. Here the very idea of limits becomes 
a “shibboleth” for technological progressives who would go on to innovate a future defined 
against it in the name of technological expansion and enhancement.53  Ross reads post-war 
futurology as the replacement of the future shock of nuclear annihilation by “dark eco-futures 
                                                        
48 Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968); Paul Ehrlich, 
“Ecocatastrophe!” Ramparts, 1970.  
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Elwood Saving Worlds (New York: Doubleday, 1973), tagged a "collection of astonishing science fiction 
about the ecological crisis" [my emphasis]. 
50 McCray, The Visioneers, 22. 
51 Ross, Strange Weather, 185.  
52 McCray, The Visioneers,  5. 
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 16 
predicated upon slow environmental deterioration and collapse.”54 The science fiction 
dystopias of the period looked ahead to crowded cities, survivalist brutality and relentless 
scarcity. The concerns and the aesthetics of these futures became less urgent but more 
entrenched through the 1980s, not least in cyberpunk’s  rainy, crowded, decrepit cities, its dirty 
realism and dreams of transcending the limits of the human body.55  
 
But accounts of the period that dwell only on imagined futures of collapse, pessimism and 
dystopia miss the element of warning and critique in dystopian science fiction, and the utopian 
speculation that was also part of the idea of environmental crisis. A stark binary between 
projected catastrophe and desired transformation was a hallmark of Western environmental 
concern from the early 1970s to around 1990, when sustainable development became the more 
powerful policy narrative framing environmental futures.56 This mood of radical green hope is 
often overlooked in histories of scientific ideas but is it vividly present in environmental 
histories and in ecopolitical philosophy’s accounts of its origins. Visions of better futures for 
humans with nature are at the heart of deep ecology, which envisages an ecocentric 
epistemology and ethics rooted in a recognition of the intrinsic value of nature and new modes 
of human well-being linked to material sufficiency and connections with nature. The idea of 
limits enables an alternative vision of living in place, of a rich culture of self-expression, 
freedom from consumerism, consumption and alienation. Economic sufficiency would restore 
humans to nature and to “the deep pleasure and satisfaction we [might] receive from close 
partnerships with other forms of life.”57 Utopian speculation is also present in ecocentric 
political proposals in the 1970s and 1980s with detailed descriptions of the no-growth 
                                                        
54 Ross, Strange Weather, 171.  
55 Ross, Strange Weather; see also Buell From Apocalypse to Way of Life.  
56 Douglas Torgerson, “Reflexivity and Developmental Constructs: The Case of Sustainable Futures.” 
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning: 1-15. 10.1080/1523908X.2013.817949; Garforth, Green 
Utopias, 40-49. 
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economy, appropriate technologies, bioregional decentralization, local democracy and a 
culture of communality and cooperation. In this period environmental thought embodies the 
aspect of apocalyptics that is about renewal and change, not despite but because it is also about 
the sense of an ending.58 
 
Speculation about a better future within limits was powerfully expressed in literary science 
fiction from the middle of the 1970s to the early 1990s. Le Guin’s Always Coming Home, 
Robinson’s Pacific Edge and Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time59 reinvented the 
genre of utopian fiction to respond to environmental crisis, articulate new political 
subjectivities, and bring to life alternatives to capitalist expansion.60 These novels do not show 
environmental crisis directly, but it haunts their fictional futures. Piercy and Robinson set their 
utopian worlds one to two hundred years in the future and describe people and lifestyles 
embodying and enacting values of sustainability, small-is-beautiful, bioregional awareness and 
local democracy. But at the limit of their worlds the environmental crisis intrudes. In Woman 
on the Edge of Time characters fight a war at the temporal and spatial edges of the utopian 
future to ensure that their timeline will prevail. The novel’s central present-day character, 
Connie Ramos, at one point crashes into the wrong future where environmental crisis has 
exploded in a hyper-capitalist future patriarchy. In Pacific Edge, we go back to the 1980s with 
the grandfather of the protagonist who is watching overshoot and collapse begin to unfold and 
                                                        
58 Killingsworth and Palmer,“Silent Spring and Science Fiction;” Stefan Skrimshire, “Eternal Return of 
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searching for the utopian desire and political strategies to change it.  In Always Coming Home 
Le Guin presents a radically ecocentric future documented through the texts of an imagined 
anthropology, a society that seems to exist because it has severed all narrative and historical 
connection to our own time. The people of the Valley, it is said, “have always lived there.”61 
But still crisis persists into the Valley:  the material detritus of a long, slow apocalypse; the 
stories people tell of stumbling into a world where “the air is thick and yellow” and “the road 
is coated with grease and feathers.”62  
 
The binary between utopian and dystopian futures both within science fiction texts and across 
the genre was part of a wider cultural response to ecological concerns from the 1970s onward. 
There was one path going ahead to the future, and it could go in one of two sharply divided 
directions: continuity vs change, rational intervention vs catastrophe, a better future with nature 
versus business as usual. This dualism, I argue, is a product of the projection of possible 
environmental crisis at a global scale into a far-away future. The idea of environmental crisis 
in the early 1970s was dependent upon certain kinds of scientific modelling. But the science 
fictionality that is also part of environmental crisis is not simply a reflection on those scientific 
projections. The very ideas that made up environmental crisis are science fictional, and its 
elaboration in (popular) science and science fiction are in many ways chronologically and 
formally inseparable. Insofar as the science fictional imagination was a critical part of 
environmental crisis and environmental knowledges in the 1970s to the 1990s, so was a rich 
sense of the social, also predominantly conceived in terms of a clear contrast between business 
as usual and the possibility of radical change, This would change significantly as ideas of 
environmental futures have become more and more dominated by climate modelling. 
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Unmodelling apocalypse: climate science and science fiction in the early 21st 
century 
 
The scientific basis of future climate scenarios is more robust and secure than previous forms 
of environmental modelling. But the social and even utopian elements that were so important 
in the first iteration of environmentalism’s futures are less radical and more fugitive. I want to 
argue that this is because the kinds of knowledges involved in projecting climate futures have 
changed, in concert with a shifting political and cultural context. Climate science and its 
institutions have helped to construct more plausible and detailed knowledge claims about 
possible and probable environmental futures. But some have argued that this consensus has 
been achieved at least in part by creating a gradualist map of climate change which does not 
formally acknowledge potentially catastrophic scenarios.  The prospect of crisis has been 
effaced in climate policies, even as it has arguably been normalised in contemporary culture.63 
The future scenarios of contemporary climate science and policy are multiple and overlapping, 
not binary as in the limits trajectory.  It is increasingly difficult to represent the future as 
radically discontinuous with the present, and harder still to imagine desirable possibilities in 
the context of locked-in carbon logics. In science fiction, however, enabled by a popular culture 
replete with tropes of climate crisis, the political, social and human dimensions supposedly 
evacuated from science and policy are vividly present. Science fiction continues to work with 
apocalyptic narratives to figure the ethical, metaphysical and even utopian possibilities of a 
climate changed world.  
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Modelling global climate systems and projecting climate futures has a complex history. 
Particularly important have been the emergence of GCMs (general or global circulation 
models) over the course of the twentieth century,64 and the more recent adoption by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of standardized scenarios for developing 
policy responses to the climate problematic. By the 1930s, Edwards shows, GCMs had become 
the ideal for long-term climate modelling, launching attempts to draw on weather data to map 
how the atmosphere and oceans maintain thermal equilibrium by receiving and re-radiating 
solar energy.65 By the 1970s, research programmes for developing GCMs were established at 
many US and other Western institutions.66 They were designed and refined to show average 
climate patterns over long periods, to “display predictable symmetry, stability and/or 
periodicity”67 and to filter out local specificity and short-term and anomalous weather events. 
By the early 1990s, under the aegis of the IPCC, a scientific consensus had emerged, based on 
converging GCM modelling: anthropogenic climate change was real, and it required global 
policy attention.68 GCMs do not make forecasts based on specific data inputs. They “replicat[e] 
the world in a machine,”69 using massive computer power to “simulate their own climates.”70 
Climate dynamics drawn from historical data are spun up, stabilised (reach equilibrium)71 and 
used to project possible future atmospheric trajectories under various conditions of climate 
forcings, the elements external to the system that drive large-scale changes.  
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Like Forrester’s dynamic systems simulations, climate models are not about predictions. They 
are designed to foreground relationships and “the planet as a dynamic system: intricately 
interconnected, articulated, evolving, but ultimately fragile and vulnerable.”72 Climate models 
too have depended on the retrospective mobilization and aggregation of patchy and often 
incommensurable data.73 Like the World Systems models, climate simulations are generally 
set to run over 50-100 years. New epistemological insights about climate depend on very high 
levels of abstraction, both spatial and temporal. In this loose political and conceptual sense, 
climate modelling did build on aspects of the world systems dynamics. But in its institutional 
and epistemic development, contemporary climate science rejected Forrester’s methods.74 It 
emerged from a very different network of tightly interlinked research centres and communities 
that are now stable and long-standing, and which have little connection with the earlier phase 
of environmental crisis modelling. Climate modelling is more sophisticated than the early days 
of global systems models, and climate knowledge is more tightly integrated.75 Through the 
IPCC there has been a hybridisation of science and public policy knowledges76 and the 
emergence of a distinct scientific and regulatory regime of climate governance.77 At its centre 
are the models themselves, serving as “technical gateways”78 in the stabilisation of climate 
knowledge, showing how economic activities in the past have created accumulations of carbon 
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gases in the atmosphere and suggesting the paths of rising concentrations of GHGs in the 
atmosphere linked to rising global temperatures over the coming decades.  
 
Within these sophisticated and tightly integrated epistemic machineries there are of course 
endemic and even irreducible uncertainties associated with attempts to predict the future of 
“large, complex and chaotic systems”, a future which includes the humans and social 
institutions whose decisions and actions might change predicted outcomes.79 Many suggest 
that the process of managing and hybridising climate knowledge around shared models has 
necessitated a reduction of the complexities in climate knowledge and resulted in an unduly 
narrow consensus on predicted climate futures.  This has been read variously as the unintended 
outcome of mobilizing policy and science around a simplified boundary object;80 an 
unavoidable consequence of the discursive construction of climate change as a governable 
knowledge-object;81 and a deliberate strategy to make climate challenges appear amenable to 
rational management.82 In any case, the result has been the dominance of gradualist models of 
climate change in global scientific and public policy models. Urry argues that the 
“reductionism” that is the source of GCM models’ projective power also pushes them to 
converge around an orthodoxy that excludes the possibility of non-linear and abrupt change.83 
Climate models tend to filter out the uncertainties of complex systems and regional variation, 
and thus underestimate the complexity of “multiple physical and social feedback 
mechanisms.”84 Wynne argues that climate models have tended to smooth out amplifying 
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dimensions of positive feedback loops and underestimate uneven accelerations and 
instabilities.85  
 
There is a policy and political dimension to the tendency of climate models to converge around 
linear and gradualist futures. Since the late 1980s climate models have been increasingly 
important to, and underwritten by, the IPCC, whose UN mission is to provide rigorous review 
and filtering of climate science for decision-makers. The UN’s policies on climate in the 20th 
century have emerged from and reproduce what Buyoff et. al. call the “myth of climate 
stabilization”86 in attempts to rationally manage a situation in which emissions have long lives 
and cumulative effects. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) remain in high concentrations in the 
atmosphere long after the activities that produced them (may or may not) have ceased. The 
recent history of intensifying carbon economies means that GHG accumulations must now get 
worse before they can get better. Climate policies, therefore, have tried to project forward a 
threshold for a safe limit to GHG accumulations in the future, and then “work back to what 
emissions scenarios will get the world to that concentration.”87 This is perhaps the ultimate in 
technocratic approaches. Anticipated futures via quantitative extrapolation are expected to act 
back on the present. Seeking to protect a threshold between safety and danger, the stabilization 
approach assumes that GHG accumulations can be managed in order to keep global 
temperature rises within a predictable range. At the high end of that range, clearly, climate 
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emissions scenarios imply dramatic changes. But crisis itself – the prospect of a future 
fundamentally discontinuous with the present, of catastrophic or runaway climate change – is 
not part of the model. Indeed, the model is designed precisely to treat the future as linear and 
calculable, and hence leave crisis out.  
 
If the dominant mode of climate modelling has brought more certainty and expert consensus 
to bear on environmental futures, it has at the same time depended on and tended to reproduce 
an expectation (what Hulme calls a “delusion” 88) of rational control. Over the past quarter 
century, climate change has emerged as a governable object in part through the construction of 
graphic emissions scenarios used by the third and fourth IPCC Assessment Reports. In its 
Special Report: Emissions Scenarios in 2000,89 the IPCC developed four broad storylines (the 
‘SRES’ scenarios) mapping divergent futures characterised by somewhat different 
demographic, socio-economic, technological and environmental trajectories, each with an 
estimate linking them to levels of annual GHG emissions and rising GHG atmospheric 
concentrations. Based on the SRES scenarios, the IPCC’s Third and Fourth reports modelled 
increasing global average surface temperatures in a range from 0.4 to 4.0 degrees Centigrade. 
The SRES scenarios show multiple futures, usually on one synthesised graph, seven or eight 
fuzzy lines each representing one hundred years or so. The lines all rise – some gently, some 
steeply. But the graph shows no break or turning point. Presenting multiple scenarios and 
possible development paths appears to offer a rational choice between scenarios.  The future 
becomes a realm of technocratic risk calculation and intervention.90  
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Climate crisis scenarios can seem more scientific and less science fictional than their earlier 
limits counterparts. Earlier apocalyptic framings of climate change have been effaced, and 
technical/neoliberal governance posited as the only solution.91 The social, political and 
existential concerns that were such a rich part of the mix of the 1970s environmental crisis are 
contained or effaced.92 But outside the narrow realm of IPCC-endorsed climate science and 
policy, catastrophe narratives have been proliferating, offering rich social and political 
explorations of a range of climate changed futures, including non-gradualist and catastrophic 
ones.  Science fiction quickly generated climate stories, mainly dark and dystopian. A brief list 
of novels would include Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower in 1993, Bruce Sterling’s Heavy 
Weather in 1994 and John Barnes’ Mother of Storms in the same year among the earliest; a 
cluster of well-known titles following what Mike Hulme has called a “turning point” in the 
cultural positioning of climate change as real and urgent in the mid-2000s: Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road in 2006, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy, especially Year of the Flood 
published in 2009, Stephen Baxter’s Flood in 2008; Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl in 
2009; and widely read Young Adult climate dystopias including Saci Lloyd’s The Carbon 
Diaries 2015 published in 2009 and Julie Bertagna’s Exodus in 2002. Dystopian and 
apocalyptic climate science fiction is now ubiquitous in popular culture.93 Most critics position 
such narratives not as warnings, as in the earlier phase of crisis writing, but as pessimistic, 
fatalistic and even conservative.94 And populist framings of future climate catastrophe can of 
course work to obscure or refuse the possibility of renewal and social change, becoming thin 
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“millennial” visions militating against collective historical interventions and suggesting a 
conservative desire to hold onto the same.95  
 
But if there is nothing “inherently transformative” in apocalyptic narratives,96 there is nothing 
inherently conservative about them either.  In a contemporary context where climate 
management and hyper-rational framings of climate adaptation and mitigation dominate, 
visions of catastrophe stir up ideas that help us to resist and complicate mainstream gradualism, 
and keep social and political questions on the agenda.97 In mainstream discourse there is, for 
Hulme, a “new climate reductionism … driven by the hegemony exercised by the predictive 
natural sciences over contingent, imaginative and humanistic accounts of social life and visions 
of the future.”98  Wynne suggests the need to develop a more “poetic” articulation of the climate 
dilemma, to enrich its sociological imagination, to expand “tacit imaginations of human and 
social actors and capacities” 99 against technocratic and gradualist discourses. For many 
commentators this work should be taken up in the social and human sciences and the newly-
christened environmental humanities.100 But this speculative technoscientific imagination, and 
especially the “poetics” of social critique, is precisely the work of science fiction. 
 
Science fiction has brought its intense narrative focus on “the transformation of human 
societies as a result of the innovations attending technoscientific projects”101 to bear on climate 
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science, and it has brought a wealth of genre resources to the exploration of possible, probable 
and desirable climate futures.  As Trexler and Canavan argue, this work is not being done 
within the utopian forms characteristic of 1970s radical socio-political response to 
environmental crisis.102  But it is not reducible to conservative catastrophism, and it includes 
powerful strands of utopian hope as well as clear-eyed critique. Contemporary Anthropocene 
fictions are reworking dystopian narratives and repurposing apocalypse to dwell in the parts of 
the climate projections that both science policy and sociology have avoided. Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s Science in the Capital trilogy, for example, brings climate crisis and the case for a 
more radical and just science into everyday life and politics.103 The novels are set five minutes 
ahead of the reader in an already mutating and multiplying present, blurring generic boundaries 
between speculation and realism.104 In Forty Signs of Rain,105 a chaotic weather event disrupts 
politics as usual when Washington D.C. floods. Domestic and urban spaces open up to strange 
new connections between humans and nonhuman subjects as individuals camp out with 
escaped zoo animals in former parks, and displaced people move in to extend the small nuclear 
Quibler family who are at the heart of the trilogy. Change in the name of sustainability comes 
not through the heroic individual actions but through the “bureaucratic” utopianism of 
networked collective agencies rippling through scientific and political institutions via “boring 
tasks” and everyday administration.106 
 
Very recent Anthropocene science fiction has become even more explicitly utopian and 
activist. New climate genres like solarpunk self-consciously position themselves against the 
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closed and gradualist logics of climate policy and the apparent deadlock of environmental 
politics, but they also work creatively with mainstream catastrophism. They are keeping the 
future open to the social imagination, to think beyond both business as usual and “mere 
survival.”107 They explore “the struggles of humanity in an already apocalyptic or dystopian 
world.”108 Here real utopian possibilities exist not in contrast to dystopian extrapolation but in 
the midst of slowly and inexorably unfolding climate change and a range of iterations of its 
catastrophic consequences, often figured spatially.  In Robinson’s New York 2140,109 partial 
urban flooding of New York creates new intertidal zones, both literally and metaphorically. 
There are new risks – flooded and collapsing buildings in Manhattan; the intensification of 
“shock doctrine” capitalism and precarious work across the globe. But there are also diverse 
communities inventing new and better social forms and ways of life together, making both 
material and political change from high-rise farms to financial market disruption. In 
Doctorow’s Walkaway,110 people are made unemployed by automation and permanently 
precarious by a new caste of the super or “zotta”111 rich. They walk away to form improvised, 
shifting communes at the spatial and social edges of so-called default reality, where hollowed 
out cities meet a polluted countryside meet the open spaces of a super-advanced wireless cloud. 
In an only partly ironic spirit, they tell each other that they are enacting “the first days of a 
better world.”112  They mobilise a multitude of post-scarcity possibilities created by new 
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technologies of digital fabrication and negotiate the many interlocking and unfolding 
consequences of global warming. These include re-appropriating, as “spaces of hope,”113 some 
of the ruined material and communal infrastructures left behind by a predatory late capitalism. 
This is the environmental crisis as “way of life” that Buell sombrely diagnosed in the early 
2000s. But it is not the fiction of mourning and loss that Buell prescribed.114 It is a fiction 
bursting with both the awfulness and the energy of the Anthropocene, with ideas for new hybrid 
natural-social alliances, with a speculative eye on the diverse possible social forms of liveable 
and perhaps in some respects better futures. 
 
Back to the limits?  
Scientific modelling has been part of modern environmentalism throughout the post-war 
period. In contemporary times the most prominent models are extremely sophisticated 
simulations of climate change trajectories. As Edwards argues, climate science now exhibits a 
high degree of consensus in relation to likely scenarios – not a single predictive “bright line,” 
but a set of “shimmering,” blurring, overlapping futures that offer a complex, multi-faceted 
and robust mapping of what might happen. They are not “predictive truth machines.” But they 
are pretty good “reality-based social and policy heuristics.”115 By contrast, the systems 
dynamics models of the limits to growth were relatively simple, unintegrated, and data-poor.116 
I have argued, however, that it was precisely the somewhat crude temporal projection of a 
singular planetary crisis in The Limits to Growth, coupled with the blurry boundaries between 
popular science and science fiction, that helped 1970s environmentalism make its 
epistemological intervention into culture and consciousness. Crisis then made environmental 
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futures a matter for social, political and ethical debate, and it produced powerful dystopian and 
utopian fiction. Crisis now is perhaps more realistic and less futuristic; climate change models 
are more scientific than science fictional. Environmental crisis in the 1970s framed the present 
as a “threshold” period, full of urgency and the possibility of radical change.117  Climate crisis 
in the early C21st is all too aware that thresholds for change may be already passing; that we 
will have to live with climate dynamics already in train; and remains committed to the rational 
and incremental management of the climate challenge.  
 
In recent years there have been demands that contemporary social and political thought should 
go ‘back’ to the limits to growth (if not The Limits to Growth). Some such demands are made 
in the name of re-mobilizing arguments for the end of economic growth, given renewed 
urgency and relevance in the aftermath of a period of global financial crises. Some suggest that 
the Club of Rome presciently announced the beginning of a period of environmental limits that 
we are still living through; that “[t]here is unsettling evidence that society is still following the 
‘standard run’ of the original study; in short that we can go back to the science of limits.118 
Others base arguments for a return to limits on something more like its science fictionality: the 
novelty and shock of the environmental crisis of the 1970s, its promise to “shatter “the self-
satisfied and self-regarding assurance of Western industrialism”119 and radically re-imagine the 
future.120  
                                                        
117 Höhler, Spaceship Earth, 11.  
118 Tim Jackson and Robin Webster, Limits Revisited: A Review of the Limits to Growth Debate (All Party 
Parliamentary Group on the Limits to Growth, 2016, http://limits2growth.org.uk/revisited), 3. Others who 
have either continued to measure the variables included in the original models or who have returned to re-
examine Limits data: See inter alia Ugo Bardi The Limits to Growth Revisited (New York: Springer, 
2011); Roberto Pasqualino, Aled W. Jones, Irene Monasterolo and Alexander Phillips, “Understanding 
Global Systems Today: A Calibration of the World3 Model between 1995 and 2012.” Sustainability 7, no. 
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I have tried to argue however that the conditions in which the limits to growth could announce 
a shattering crisis and in which cultural narratives could play out stark political alternatives are 
no longer in place. Limits and climate crises belong to two distinct periods of environmental 
politics and consciousness, the first characterised by a forceful and radical challenge to 
dominant ideologies of progress and economic growth, the second unfolding in the context of 
the internalisation and normalisation of that challenge and the new challenge of climate 
change.121  Crisis can no longer perform the old anticipatory or utopian function, in particular 
as a  way of thinking against dominant assumptions of unlimited economic growth or the 
association of economic development with progress, justice and human wellbeing. As we have 
seen in relation to contemporary climate science fiction, crisis now has to be figured in terms 
of multiple futures that often shrink into the present. The binary certainties of the limits to 
growth have ceded to the many emergent possibilities of climate scenarios. Utopian desire and 
social alternatives must be thought of as growing within not in opposition to unfolding 
environmental catastrophe.  
 
What Andersson characterises as “the great future debate and the struggle for the world” in the 
1960s and 1970s was between technocratic expertise and quantitative predictions on one side 
and humanist reflection and utopian desire on the other.122 In relation to environmental futures, 
by the 1990s and 2000s that struggle had been complicated by everyday apocalypse, resistance, 
indifference and new kinds of uncertainty in relation to climate and environmental crisis. But 
                                                        
121 This internalisation and normalisation has been discussed under a number of signs: sustainable 
development, ecological modernization, the politics of unsustainability inter alia. See for example 
discussions in Torgerson, “Reflexivity and Developmental Contexts”; Urry Climate Change and Society; 
Buell From Apocalypse to Way of Life; Swyngedouw, “Apocalypse Forever?”; Ingulfur Blühdorn, 
“Sustaining the Unsustainable: Symbolic Politics and the Politics of Simulation,” Environmental Politics 
16, no. 2 (2007): 251-75. 
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as I have indicated in relation to the emerging fictions of climate and the Anthropocene, science 
fictionality remains a critical part of how we can come to understand environmental futures 
and environmental challenges. If mainstream climate governance and politics have written 
crisis out of their projected futures, science fiction has continued to use and transform the trope 
of crisis in order to both anticipate and challenge likely eco-futures. Science fiction is already 
doing the work that social scientists suggest is the proper job of sociologists and science 
studies: talking about discontinuous futures; re-socialising climate science; arguing about what 
matters ethically and ontologically as we move into the Anthropocene; working in-between the 
speculative and the real.   
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